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Sectoral Strategies and Participant
Commitments: The Keys to
Effective Trade and Industrial
Policies
by

Robert E. Scott

New forms of
industrialassistance
and new nstitutions
to assess industry
structure nd develop
policy areneeded to
create high wage
manufact uringjobs.

The declining competitiveness of the U.S. manufacturing sector is one of the most important causes of the decline in
real wages and the stagnation in
the level of the median family
incomes which have plagued the
United States since about 1973.1
Although the reports of the decline in American living standards were greeted with some
skepticism when they first appeared in the work of the
Economic Policy Institute ("EPI") in 1985, they have now
achieved a high level of prominence on the national policy
agenda. More recent studies by EPI and other research
groups urge two cures for the decline. First, employment
and output in the manufacturing sectors must increase in
order to sustain increases in the real median income of two
to three percent per year while simultaneously reducing the
national unemployment rate. Second, new forms of industrial assistance and new public and private institutions to
Robert E. Scott is a research associatewith the Economic
Strategy Institute and an Assistant Professorof Business at the
University of Maryland's College of Business and Management.
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assess industry structure and develop policy are needed to create
high-wage manufacturing jobs.
Industrial policies will
be ineffective unless they are developed in the context of a stable
macroeconomic environment
with full employment, stable
prices and interest rates, and balanced trade. The Clinton administration is taking steps in these
directions, but its deficit reduction program threatens to
worsen unemployment unless further steps are taken to
revitalize the goods producing sectors of the economy.
Policies which increase the competitiveness of all
U.S. workers and industries, such as investments in human
capital and infrastructure, are also highly desirable elements of an effective industrial policy. These can be supplemented with specific policies to raise the demand for goods
produced in the United States, including: 1) public procurement (e.g., environmental cleanup, housing/urban renewal,
energy efficiency/public transportation); 2) trade policies
to assist both "sunrise" industries (those which enjoy a trade
surplus) and "sunset" sectors (those currently experiencing
trade deficits); 3) investment policies to increase the ben-
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efits of foreign direct investment in the United States
(including local content regulations).
Macroeconomic stability, public investment, and
even targeted demand enhancements will not be sufficient
to restore the competitiveness of many domestic industries.
Exporting industries face a host of anti-competitive behaviors and practices which restrict access to foreign markets
and create advantages for producers in these countries.
Import-competing industries have also been scarred by the
period of sustained dollar over-valuation which occurred
in the early- and mid-1980s and by more than a decade of
what at best may be viewed as benign neglect. Competitiveness is also influenced by a host of structural problems
which are the result of domestic factors such as the small
number of firms which have dominated U.S. auto production in the post-war era.
Sector specific studies which have been published
by the Economic Policy Institute, the Berkeley Roundtable
on International Economy, and the Institute for International Economics suggest that sector specific trade and
industrial policies, when required, must be designed to
address the particular needs and problems of that industry
in order to be effective. 2 While the authors of these studies
differ about the need for specific types of policies, there is
general agreement that policies must be designed to address the specific problems caused by imperfect competition and other forms of "market failure" and by the unfair
practices of foreign competitors. Trade and industrial policies often provide assistance by shielding participants from
the winds of competition, providing an umbrella under
which prices can be raised and output decreased. In these
cases incentives must be created which encourage firms to
use such protection to expand output, increase efficiency,
and improve quality while minimizing price increases. The
precise nature of the incentives required depends on the
structure of the industry being helped. Commitments will
generally be required from all who benefit from sectoral
policies (e.g., firms, workers, and state and local governments).
Critics of industrial and trade policies are quick to
point out that measures of the type outlined here represent
extensive interference in the workings of the "private
market." It is important to acknowledge at the outset that a
number of policies which interfere with the workings of the
market distort the performance of the market in ways which
make U.S. firms less competitive. For example, U.S. imports of autos from Japan have been restrained since 1981,
resulting in substantial increases in auto prices in the
United States. 3 However, the market share of U.S. producers has continued to decline and the United Auto Workers

has lost more than 300,000 members since 1978.4 Participant commitments are one of the key missing ingredients
necessary to make our existing network of implicit and
explicit trade and industrial policies work more effectively.
Participant commitments will obligate firms and workers
to make sacrifices in exchange for trade and industrial

Governments in many other
countries have developed a
broad range of trade and
industrial policies which take
advantage of the new
opportunities created by these
types of market imperfections.
The United States has remained
a largely passive bystander in
this intense competition....
assistance including, for example, pledges to restrain price
increases and implement flexible work rules and total
quality management programs.
WHY TRADE AND INDUSTRIES MATTER
Trade, as measured by the share of imports or
exports in gross domestic product, is about one-eighth of
output. Some economists claim that because of this small
share trade is of limited economic importance to the United
States.5 Nothing could be farther from the truth, for at least
four reasons. Trade matters because it has a large affect on:
employment in high-wage manufacturing jobs; productivity growth trends; service-sector employment shares; and
overall wage levels.
Manufacturing Employment
Manufacturing jobs are desirable because they
provide high-wage employment to a large segment of the
workforce. Average weekly earnings in U.S. manufacturing in 1989 were forty percent higher than in services and
127 percent higher than in retail trade. And yet between
1979 and 1989 the United States lost 1.4 million manufacturing jobs and gained 9.8 million jobs in the service sector
and 4.6 million in retail trade. 6 Wages are higher in manufacturing than in other sectors in part because these sectors
are imperfectly competitive and both workers and firms
earn above-normal returns, or rents, in most manufacturing industries. Recent research has shown that trade policy

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

SECTORAL STRATEGIES
can improve national welfare when it increases the national
share of such high-wagejobs, relative to total international
employment in such jobs.7 Furthermore, despite all the
attention which services-sector trade has received in the
popular press, the great majority of all non-financial trade
flows involve goods trade-agricultural products, natural
resources, and above all, manufactured goods.
Because manufacturers dominate our trade flows,
the decline in the U.S. trade balance has caused a reduction
in U.S. manufacturing industry employment. The loss of
good manufacturing jobs is an important cause of the
decline in real wages and the stagnation in U.S. living
standards experienced in the 1980s. Manufacturing and
other forms of goods production have also declined in other
developed countries, but not as rapidly as in the United
States, which has the smallest industrial sector of any major
developed country. In 1990, only twenty-six percent of the
U.S. workforce was employed in goods production (including mining, construction, and manufacturing), versus
forty percent in Germany, thirty-four percent in Japan,
thirty percent in France and twenty-nine percent in the
U.K. 8
Productivity Growth Trends
The United States has experienced a sustained
decline in its rate of overall productivity growth from a
long-run average of about two percent per year (and a postwar surge of three percent per year between 1946 and 1973)
to a miserable one percent per year. The decline in industrial employment contributes to the productivity slowdown
in two ways. First, the substitution of low-wage service
jobs for high- wage industrial jobs lowers average output
per worker. Second, productivity growth rates are typically
highest in the manufacturing sectors, where capital/labor
substitution and learning curve possibilities are greater
than in other sectors. The decline in manufacturing's employment share reduces the impact of manufacturing sector
productivity growth on average output per worker throughout the economy simply because its weight in total output
has become smaller.
Service Sector Employment Shares
Service jobs provide last-resort employment for
those unable to find jobs in goods producing sectors. Some
service-sector jobs do pay high wages, particularly in
professional business services (e.g., law, accounting, and
computer programming). However, the manufacturing sector is one of the most important customers for high-wage
business services, and hence the "good" service sectorjobs
remain tied to manufacturing competitiveness.
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The service sector in the United States is much
larger than in other industrialized countries. Furthermore,
the rate of growth in service sector employment has been
higher in the United States than in some other countries
(especially Japan) in the 1970s and 1980s. The huge size of
the U.S. service sector is not the result of a "natural" shift
out of declining manufacturing industries. It is a direct
consequence ofthe deteriorating trade performance of U.S.
manufacturing. Because most service jobs pay very low
wages, the rapid growth in this sector's share of U.S.
employment has had a severely depressing effect on U.S.
wage and income levels.
Overall Wage Levels
The internationalization of the domestic economy
has depressed wage levels in several ways, in addition to
the direct loss of high-wage manufacturing and business
servicejobs discussed above. The elimination of thosejobs
has increased the supply of semi- and unskilled workers in
the economy, relative to demand, with a depressing effect
on U.S. wages. Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") by U.S.
firms also puts domestic workers into competition with
workers with similar skill levels in other countries. For
example, U.S. firms began to use the threat of moving
manufacturing plants to the Maquiladora region to extract
wage concessions from their workers in the 1980s. In
addition, low-cost imports put domestic workers into indirect competition with foreign labor in many industries,
resulting in stagnant or declining real wages in these
sectors as well. Thus trade influences a much broader share
of the economy than the twelve or thirteen percent of gross
domestic product ("GDP") which directly involves imports
or exports.
Edward Leamer has estimated that the completion
of the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement
will be directly responsible for an additional decline of
$1,000 per year in wage incomes for low skilled workers in
the United States. 9 Between 1979 and 1989 the real wages
of the poorest twenty percent of all Americans declined by
more than one quarter of one percent per year, while those
of the top twenty percent increased by more than one
percent per year and the top five percent of all workers saw
their incomes grow by more than 1.5 percent per year. 10 A
substantial share of the decline in the real wages of the
poorest segment of the population is directly related to the
increased internationalization of the U.S. economy during
this period.
Despite all the problems described above, trade
grew about twice as fast as real output, worldwide, in the
1970s and 1980s. Foreign direct investment exploded,
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growing about 3.5 times as fast as real world GDP. 11
Furthermore, trade is increasingly driven by the search to
exploit imperfections in the structure of markets, factors
which can generate enormous profits for both firms and for
the societies in which they prosper. As a result, much of the
expansion in trade has involved what is known as intraindustry trade, in which one country both imports and
exports similar types of products in the same industry.
Conditions of trade when markets are imperfectly
competitive have been the subject of a decade of intensive
research in what has come to be known as the new trade

The United States must first
create a climate in which
productivity-enhancing
investments can yield positive
returns.
theory. This new approach has focused on the study of
many different types of market imperfections, including:
(a) scale economies, which can leave room for only a few
firms in the global industry (such as aircraft production),
and which may reflect large fixed costs for research and
development as well as traditional scale factors; (b) learning curves, which result in substantial, sustained cost
reductions as output expands (common in the production of
electronic products such as transistors, computer chips, and
photovoltaic cells); (c) knowledge spillovers, common in
high-technology industries such as biotechnology (green
revolution plant varieties), computers and machine tools,
which result in benefits going to the consumers of new
products, as well as producers; (d) high risks in producing
and marketing new products combined with barriers small
firms face in obtaining access to capital markets, which can
limit investments in pharmaceuticals and other biotechnology fields.
Governments in many other countries have developed a broad range of trade and industrial policies which
take advantage of the new opportunities created by these
types of market imperfections. The United States has
remained a largely passive bystander in this intense competition for what has come to be know as "created comparative advantage." The decline in the manufacturing sector is
testimony to the wisdom of the U.S. policy of benign
neglect.
In order for trade and industrial policies to have
any hope of succeeding, the United States must first create

a climate in which productivity-enhancing investments
(both public and private) can yield positive returns. Before
tackling complex, industry-specific trade and industry
policy problems and opportunities, it will be necessary to
put into effect a series of facilitating policies referred to
previously. These facilitating policies will be briefly discussed before turning to an examination of the kinds of
trade and industrial policies which have been used and a
discussion of policies which should be developed in the
future for four large, established U.S. manufacturing industries.
THE FIRST STEPS
Macroeconomic stability, public investment, and
targeted demand enhancements are necessary to increase
the share of manufactured goods in total output and to
reduce or eliminate our trade deficit. Such policies can
stimulate the competitiveness of U.S. industries and provide the foundation for sustained increases in the rates of
growth of long-term productivity levels and real wages.
These policies are needed to create the economic and social
environments in which sector-specific trade and industrial
policies can contribute significantly to productivity and
wage growth.
Macroeconomic Stability
Full employment, stable prices and interest rates,
and limited federal borrowing are goals which every administration would subscribe to. The way in which we seek
to achieve these goals, and the priorities set among them,
will have huge effects on the competitiveness of U.S.
manufacturers. Of particular concern is the relationship
between trade and budget deficits. There is an accounting
relationship between the trade and budget deficits which
has resulted in the development of a "twin deficits" literature. By definition, the trade deficit is equal to the differ2
ence between national saving and domestic investment.1
The federal government's budget deficit is a use of national
savings, and therefore an increase in the federal deficit will,
holding everything else constant, result in an increase in the
trade deficit. However, in the real world changes in the
federal budget deficit usually affect other components of
national savings and domestic investment, as well as the
trade account. More to the point, Robert A. Blecker points
out that government policies to improve competitiveness
can simultaneously lead to an improvement in the trade
balance and an increase in national savings. Direct deficit
reduction measures (such as a reduction in infrastructure
spending) may have perverse effects on both the trade
balance and the federal budget deficit if they reduce our
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competitiveness. Blecker argues that measures to attain
full employment should have first priority, along with
measures to improve our international competitiveness.
The former should include efforts to coordinate
macroeconomic policies with other developed countries
(to increase global demand for all products). Competitiveness policies must be developed to address structural trade
deficits with countries such as Japan, China, and Taiwan.
Import surcharges and, especially in the case of Japan,
other market opening policies should be used to improve
the U.S. trade balance with these chronic surplus coun13
tries.
Public Investment
Investments in education and training can be used
as industrial policy tools. There is an extensive body of
experience with training programs in other countries, and
in state and local governments, which provides a number of
important lessons for human capital development.' 4 Such
programs, which should target disadvantaged groups, should
also create incentives for both individual firms and
consortiums of firms, unions, and schools to engage in a
wide variety of locally controlled training activities. Firms
should be required to support these activities with a tax
which is graduated to reflect the fact that small firms have
difficulty retaining the benefits of training their workers
because of their higher turnover rates. This should be a
payroll tax of the pay-or-play variety, with firms receiving
tax credits for training expenditures. Apprenticeship programs, while important, will probably have to be accompanied by other education and youth employment initiatives
in order to be successful. Increases in wage levels, especially at the lower end of the wage spectrum would provide
important incentives for firms to upgrade the skill and
productivity levels of their employees and would discourage firms from following a low-wage path to improved
competitiveness.
Public infrastructure investments can be of both a
general form (highways, airports) and an industry or region
specific nature. The latter necessarily involves some type
of targeting. Paul Geroski has argued that groups of closely
related firms concentrated in particular locations can benefit from external economies and from a dynamic competitive environment. 15 Such agglomeration economies can be
fostered by public investments in specialized education,
transportation, and distribution systems.

TargetedDemand Enhancements
The slowdown in rates of growth of output per
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worker in the developed countries, which began in the
1970s and 1980s may worsen in the 1990s. 16 It is very
difficult to achieve high levels of productivity growth in the
absence of sustained increases in demand. Problems caused
by the overall slowdown in growth have been compounded
by a shift in the production of manufactured goods to Japan
and some developing countries, particularly those in East
and Southeast Asia, during this period.
Demand for U.S. products can be increased using
public procurement, trade, and investment policies, as
suggested above. Publicprocurementof socially desirable
projects such as sewage treatment facilities, low-income
housing and urban renewal packages, and inter- and intracity mass transit can reduce unemployment and create
demand for a stream of high-technology industrial products. Demand for these products can also be stimulated by
substantial increases in energy and pollution taxes. Increased public investment, if financed through such new

Trade restraints should be used
to provide assistance to
domestic industries which can
demonstrate that they have
been injured by imports.
revenue measures, could offset the contractionary effects
of reduced defense spending in the domestic economy.
However, infrastructure spending would have a larger
"multiplier" effect on output than defense spending because a larger share of such expenditures would be retained
in the domestic economy (as opposed, for example, to
military payrolls and expenditures for maintaining foreign
bases which have a higher tendency to generate demand for
imported goods and services).
Trade policies can be used both to open foreign
markets to sunrise industries and to decrease the import
share of sunset sectors. Market opening measures are
trade-expanding and efforts to protect domestic markets
are trade-contracting. Economists who utilize the theory of
trade in perfectly competitive markets and empirical studies based on these assumptions claim that trade expanding
measures will always enhance global income and consumer welfare. This point of view fails to account for
important, trade distorting market failures which are responsible for the growth of intra-industry trade, and it also
ignores adjustment costs caused by trade expansion. There
are at least two general arguments for protecting domestic
markets. First, such policies are needed to reverse the huge
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flood of imports which entered U.S. markets in the 1980s
as a result of flawed macroeconomic policies and the
opportunistic strategies of foreign firms and governments.
The second argument assumes that large domestic industries are going to obtain protection if they have been injured
by imports (by exercising their rights under U.S. trade
laws) and asserts that new trade policies will be less
restrictive than the policies which will result from enforcement of those statutes (for example, the anti-dumping and
countervailing duty ("CVD") cases involving the steel and
auto industries). Anti-dumping tariffs and CVDs can be
highly disruptive to trade patterns, because they can completely eliminate imports from some producers and cause
17
our trading partners to pursue retaliatory actions.
Trade restraints should be used to provide assistance to domestic industries which can demonstrate that
they have been injured by imports. Domestic firms have
become more aggressive and more effective in their use of
the anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws in the
United States in the past two decades. 18 Recent administrations have tended to settle big cases (e.g. autos and steel) by
negotiating voluntary restraint agreements with exporters.
Substantial tariffs have been applied in a number of smaller
cases and were imposed on a large class of steel imports in
mid-1993) 9
Several general principles should be applied in
developing new import adjustment policies. First, the United
States should greatly reduce reliance on anti-dumping and
countervailing duty law, in favor of more general import
assistance under the escape clause of U.S. trade law (which
is referred to as a safeguard measure in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs). This assistance should generally take the form of a tariff, or better yet a global auction
quota in which the rights to import goods into the United
States are sold to the highest bidders. 20 An auction quota
would prevent import surges, which tend to occur during
recessions. Second, in order to accomplish this objective,
the standard by which injury is defined in escape clause
cases should be relaxed. Current standards require that
imports be at least as important as any other source of injury
before assistance can be provided. 21 This standard should
be converted to a threshold criteria, which defines a minimum level of import injury in terms of output or revenues
(e.g., a five percent threshold), and which uses foreign
market share (as opposed to changes in sales volume) to
evaluate the effects of imports on domestic producers.
Finally, countries should no longer be required to provide
compensation to countries injured by escape clause protection (in the form of reduced barriers to other exports from
the injured country), as required by the current GATT code.

The compensation provision makes countries reluctant to
provide escape clause relief and makes it impossible to use
such policies to increase the overall competitiveness of
domestic industries, as suggested here. Specific trade policy
proposals for several sunset industries and their relationships to industrial policies are considered below.
Investment Policies can be used to increase the
domestic share, or local content, of goods produced in U.S.
manufacturing facilities which are owned by foreignbased corporations (transplants). 22 The U.S. trade deficit is
increasingly driven by imports to feed transplants. Threefourths of the U.S. trade deficit with Japan is composed of
automobiles and auto parts. 23 The Japanese share of the
U.S. market (including vehicles made by Japanese firms
and sold under U.S. nameplates) increased from twentyfour percent of U.S. vehicle sales in 1984 to thirty-seven
percent in 1990. However, Japanese exporters recently
reduced their quota for auto exports to the United States to

It may be ultimately desirable
to split GM into two or more
final auto assembly
companies to increase
competition in the domestic
market and to further
streamline management of
its constituent parts.
1.65 million cars, which is lower than the quota level
applied in the early 1980s. 24 Transplant production is
primarily responsible for the growth in the Japanese share
of the U.S. market in the 1980s, and substantial increases
in the auto trade deficit are the result of increased parts
imports to supply these plants.
Governments in Canada, Europe, and Japan are
much more aggressive than the U.S. government in developing policies to encourage greater local returns from
foreign direct investment. In Europe, informal negotiations
generally take place at the plant or firm level. Thus, for
example, Toyota has agreed to achieve ninety per cent local
content by August, 1995.25 Investment policies should be
developed to increase the local content levels of transplants
operating in the United States.
INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICIES TO
INCREASE COMPETITIVENESS
Demand enhancement policies often support and/
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or protect specific domestic industries. These policies
should be coordinated with other measures designed to
increase the competitiveness of the affected industries.
They should address the particular market failures and
structural problems which confront each sector, including
foreign subsidies, non-tariff barriers, and other policies
which limit access to foreign markets.
The need to develop such policies for sunrise
sectors, especially those which use extensive amounts of
R&D, has been well established by Laura D'Andrea Tyson
and the Berkeley Roundtableon International Economics
("BRIE") group. 26 The tools and policy levers which can
be employed in such industries as aircraft, semiconductors,
and high-definition television, include R&D subsidies and
training grants, anti-trust exemptions for research and
production joint ventures, public procurement, and trade
policies designed to promote the opening of foreign markets. The latter have included bilateral, sector specific
deals in aircraft and semiconductors. 27 The "Super 301"
section of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, which targets "unjustifiable and unreasonable" trade
practices which impede U.S. exports, has been used to
expand markets for cellular telephones and
28
supercomputers.
This section will review the history of trade and
industrial policies and will recommend new policies for
four sunset sectors: motor vehicles, steel, textiles and
apparel. In the case of the auto industry, protection was
provided without requirements to make any competitiveness enhancing commitments in return. In the case of the
steel industry, trade policies were combined with measures
requiring that the industry reinvest its cash flow in worker
retraining and capital improvements. The textile and apparel industries have been protected since the 1950s by a
combination of gradually expanding quotas and tariffs.
The quotas were increased rapidly in the 1980s and few
steps were taken to improve the competitiveness of domestic producers.
The U.S. auto industry was the first major domestic sector to receive trade protection in the 1980s. No other
facilitating industrial policies were employed. As a result,
the competitiveness of the industry continued to decline
and the survival of GM, the largest firm, in its present form
is still in doubt. Trade and industrial policies helped the
steel industry recover in the 1980s, but future trade policies
may de-stabilize the world industry in the 1990s. The
textile and apparel industries have experienced the largest
declines in output and employment among this group, yet
the textile industry is still highly competitive on world
markets. An array of industrial policies are available which
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could help the apparel industry increase its competitiveness, but these have yet to be applied on a large scale.
These case studies will illustrate a basic principal
from microeconomic theory: that there should be a close
relationship between policy tools and sources of market
failures. Problems fundamentally domestic in nature (for
example, those related to excess concentration) should be
addressed with domestic industrial policies. Those which
are rooted in international exchange (for example, dumping and public subsidies) should be addressed with trade
policies. These studies will also provide support for recent
theoretical results which demonstrate thatpursuing trade or
industrial policies alone can reduce industry welfare whereas
an appropriate combination of both types of policies could
improve it.29
The JapaneseAuto Export Restraints
The U.S. auto industry is struggling under a set of
problems both cyclical and long-term in nature. The recession made 1991 the worst year on record for the domestic
auto industry, which lost $7.5 billion while total domestic
car and truck sales fell to 12.4 million units, down 11.2
percent from the 1990 total of about fourteen million. The
industry also has a continuing competitive problem with
Japanese auto producers, who increased their total share of
the U.S. auto market by thirteen percentage points between
1984 and 1990. This occurred despite the fact that Japanese
auto exports to the United States have been limited by a
Voluntary Restraint Agreement ("VRA") since 1981. GM,
in particular, has endured a prolonged decline with its share
of the total market falling from about forty-five percent in
the early 1980s to less than thirty-five percent today,
including a one year decline of almost five points between
1986 and 1987.
In 1992 total U.S. auto sales were up about three
percent. Ford and Chrysler have captured their market
share from the Japanese and both have seen sales increase
by about eleven percent. GM continued to struggle. Its total
sales increased by only 2.3 percent over the disastrous
levels of 1991, and its market share continues to sink. The
problems of the U.S. auto industry are now synonymous
with the question of what should be done with General
Motors.
The U.S. auto industry has two basic structural
problems. The first is inadequate competition, which is the
result of scale economies in production, new product development and marketing, and a history of lax anti-trust
enforcement. The second is GM's particular inability to
undertake the reforms necessary to become competitive.
These structural problems have had a number of distinct
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effects on the competitiveness of U.S. auto producers. In
the late 1970s, U.S. firms fell behind Japanese producers
both in terms of production costs and vehicle quality in the
small car segments. These problems were compounded
when gasoline prices nearly doubled between 1979 and
1981. Demand for small cars jumped sharply and the
Japanese share of the U.S. auto market jumped seven
percentage points between 1979 and 1980.30 These problems led to the negotiation in 1981 of the VRAs restricting
Japanese auto exports to the United States.
It is interesting to note that in 1980 and 198 1, prior
to the completion of the VRA negotiations, some U.S. auto
producers and leaders of the United Auto Workers recommended that price and wage restraints be required as a quid
pro quo in return for protection. This type of measure
would have helped the industry resist the temptation to
raise prices under the umbrella of protection. This request
31
for assistance was denied by the Reagan Administration.
Effects of Protection
The VRAs resulted in substantially higher prices
of both imported and domestic vehicles and some increases

A cartel can be designed as
an industrial policy measure
which addresses the domestic
market failures associated
with capital intensive
production and global excess
capacity.
in domestic small car output. The effects differed significantly across firms. The VRAs caused the prices of small
cars sold by all U.S. makers to increase by eleven to thirteen
percent. Only GM increased prices across all sizes of
vehicles. Ford and Chrysler had either no change or decreases in the prices of their larger cars as a result of the
VRAs in this period. Total vehicle sales of the Big Three
increased by about six percent following the VRAs, but
again the results differed sharply among the firms. Ford and
Chrysler were able to increase their sales of small cars by
twenty-four to twenty-nine percent, but no significant
output effect was observed at GM. 32 These firm-specific
differences help explain the decline in GM's market share
noted above.
The VRAs also created incentives for Japanese
firms to build vehicles in the United States in order to get

around the VRAs. In 1992 Japanese firms assembled approximately 1,800,000 vehicles in the United States and
Canada (including joint venture facilities with U.S. auto
producers). These facilities did create some jobs in the
industry. But because they resulted in a tremendous increase in auto parts imports to supply these facilities and
because most of their production was used to capture
market share from U.S.-based auto makers, their net effect
was to displace substantial numbers of workers and sub33
stantially worsen the trade deficit.
Policy Proposals
The VRAs primarily resulted in higher prices and
profits for domestic producers. GM, in particular, was
more likely to raise prices and less inclined to expand
output in response to reduced import competition. The
industry earned very large profits in the mid-1980s as a
result of the VRA-induced price increases discussed above,
which it used, in part, to diversify. GM purchased EDS and
Hughes Aerospace, Ford invested in a savings bank and a
leasing company, and Chrysler bought four money-losing
auto rental companies and Gulfstream Aerospace. Most of
these investments were unsuccessful, 34 and the industry
squandered the opportunities it had to regain market share
from the Japanese in the 1980s because of its failure to use
VRAs to increase output. As a result, most recent proposals
to increase protection for the auto industry have also
included performance requirements for the industry.
Senator Max Baucus proposed a bill in 1992
which would have provided increased protection for domestic producers. In exchange for that protection the industry would have been required to demonstrate improvements in quality levels and customer satisfaction, using the
standards developed for the Baldridge Quality Awards. In
addition, his bill would have imposed limits on executive
compensation and encouraged worker training and joint
research and development. The problem is that these
requirements alone fail to address the industry's structural
problems, reflected in its tendency to raise prices rather
than output, and in the management problems which have
plagued the industry, and GM in particular, in the 1970s
and 1980s.
Washington industrial policy advocates have combined an emphasis on opening foreign markets with proposals providing subsidies to domestic producers. These
include a training tax credit (Pat Choate, Manufacturing
Policy Center), tax credits for buying new cars and low
interest loans for joint industry R&D (Kevin Kearns, formerly of the Economic Strategy Institute), and health
insurance cost pooling with Japanese transplant operations
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to take away part of the advantage they gain from having
a young, newly hired work force (David Hirschland,
UAW Social Security Department). While these measures may improve the bottom lines of domestic producers, they will not address the industry's basic structural
35
problems.
Industrial and managed trade policies should
address the U.S. auto industry's two central obstacles. In
order to provide resources for the industry to rebuild, it
will be necessary to impose additional restrictions on U.S.
auto imports in the future. The best mechanism to achieve
this goal would be an auction quota or tariff, to minimize
net losses to the United States associated with the transfer
of quota rents to foreign producers. In addition to trade
restriction, some form of price restraint (possibly including a roll-back mechanism) should be required to limit
rent-seeking behavior in this industry.
One of the most interesting ideas for a price
restraint mechanism is a quantity incentive. Each firm
would be given a market share incentive, based on its
historical performance patterns. It would be taxed if it
failed to meet the incentive level, and would receive taxrebates ifit exceeded the target level. The rebates could be
financed with revenues from the auction quota or tariff.
Each firm could then set prices and quality levels as it saw
fit, to achieve its target market share. Penalties could be
set at levels such that firm profits would be higher with
trade restrictions and the penalties than without either, so
that firms would enter into such agreements voluntarily.
This would protect the United States' interest in increasing domestic auto output levels, increasing employment
in the auto industry and related supplier sectors and
improving the U.S. trade deficit with Japan.
The United States needs a more competitive
auto industry. The Japanese industry consists of eight
highly competitive firms. There are only three firms in the
United States, not enough to ensure competitive behavior
in this industry, in part because of its extensive product
differentiation. Left to their own devices, U.S. auto producers will experience continuing market share erosion
and are likely to squander their capital in futile efforts to
diversify, as they did in the 1980s. Competition in the
industry can be enhanced through the judicious use of
local content legislation, which would raise the labor
content of Japanese cars assembled here and create more
opportunities for domestic parts producers to share in the
benefits of working with Japanese assemblers. Local
content regulations could increase the effective number
of integrated auto producers in the United States.
With respect to the particular problems facing
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GM, the first step is to divest many of its parts-making
subsidiaries to take advantage of the efficiencies available
in a less centralized system of management and control.
Market forces have notbrought about the necessary changes
in GM's structure (through, for example, a leveraged
buyout). It may be ultimately desirable to split GM into two
or more final auto assembly companies to increase competition in the domestic market and to further streamline
management of its constituent parts.
Trade and Industrial Policies for the U.S. Steel Industry
The steel industry is characterized by a number of
market imperfections, involving both structure and conduct at the firm level. Firm behavior in the United States,
Japan, and Europe is also shaped by a number of government regulatory and industrial policies which combine to
produce distinct regulatory regimes in each region. Interaction between market forces and regulatory regimes have
tended to destabilize the industry during periods of weak
product demand, which have become increasingly frequent
and severe in the past twenty years.
Market Imperfections
The steel market diverges from the model of the
perfectly competitive industry in at least five significant
ways, three of which result from structural market failures
and two of which result from government behavior. The
existence of significant scale economies in basic steel
production is the fundamental determinant of market structure. These economies, combined with a relatively low
level of product demand and high transportation costs,
provided substantial barriers to entry to domestic steel
markets during the first half of the twentieth century.
Growth in the size of product markets, reductions in transportation costs, the development of a competitive fringe of
"mini-mill" producers and the growth of competitive exports from third world countries eroded the market power
of basic steel producers in the triad countries beginning in
the 1960s. The ability of large firms to dominate product
markets and earn above-normal returns was eroded in the
1970s and 1980s. However, the industry is still characterized by large fixed costs, which have resulted in periods of
intense price competition when product demand is weak.
This competition is rooted in international trade patterns.
The structural problems of the steel industry were
compounded in the 1970s and 1980s by a sharp shift in steel
consumption patterns. World steel output nearly doubled
between 1960 and 1975, but increased only twenty percent
between 1975 and 1990. After 1975 the growth of steel
demand was constrained by technological factors includ-
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ing downsizing in the auto market and the substitution of
synthetic materials for steel in many products. Steel output
also became much more variable after 1975, with the
industry experiencing sustained declines of more than ten
percent of output in the mid 1970s and early 1980s.
The combination of high fixed costs with periods
of substantial excess capacity has frequently resulted in
price dumping, in both domestic and foreign markets.
Dumping is both illegal and a potential market failure.
Legally, dumping is defined as selling below cost in a
foreign market. Selling below cost is anti-competitive, in
an economic sense, when it is the result of predatory
behavior which is designed to reduce competition in either
the domestic or foreign market. Prior to the mid-i 960s the
U.S. steel industry was able to exercise price restraint
during periods of reduced demand. 36 However, the growth
of competition from imports and mini-mills has resulted in
increased price competition, especially during periods of
slack demand, since the 1970s. Allegations of dumping in
international trade have become increasingly common
during this period. Government policy in such cases is
discussed below.
A third market imperfection is the existence of
substantial wage premiums or rents for workers in this
industry. These rents reflect the fact that steel workers earn
wages higher than those available in alternative jobs. The
existence of such rents can justify trade intervention at the
37
national level.
Government Intervention
European and Japanese governments have intervened frequently in the steel market, fora variety of reasons
and with some success. Governments in Europe have
heavily subsidized steel production for many years. 38 For
example, between 1980 and 1985 the European Community provided more than $35 billion in subsidies to their
steel producers. Steel producers in Japan and Europe have
also been allowed to establish formal and informal cartels
which restrain output during periods of excess demand and
prevent price dumping in their home markets. As a result,
steel prices in Japan remained fifteen percent higher than
those in the United States in 1992. Industry-wide profits in
Japan totaled $2 billion in 1991, as compared to a net
39
income of -$2.1 billion in the U.S. steel industry.
The combination of subsidies and home market
cartelization has allowed European and Japanese steel
producers to engage in aggressive price discounting in the
United States during periods of reduced demand. U.S.
firms have responded to these price wars with periodic
waves of legal complaints under U.S. trade laws which

prohibit dumping and subsidized imports. Each time the
industry filed a major set of dumping and countervailing
duty (CVD or anti-subsidy) complaints in the 1970s and
1980s these cases were settled by the administration through
a negotiated agreement in which foreign producers agreed
to "voluntarily" restrict exports to the U.S. market or to
40
maintain a price floor in this market.
The U.S. steel industry was protected by another
set of VRAs between 1982 and 1992. In June 1992, after the
Steel VRAs expired, U.S. producers filed a series of dumping and CVD complaints with the U.S. government for a
number of the most important, flat-rolled steel products.
Preliminary dumping margins ranging between 0.3 percent
and 109 percent for individual producers were announced
by the U.S. Department of Commerce in January, which
had earlier announced substantial (additional) CVD mar41
gins.
De-StabilizingRegulatory Regime
The combination of imperfections in the steel
market and the disparate industrial and trade policies pursued in each region of the triad have served to de-stabilize
steel markets during periods of reduced demand. Producers
in all three markets tend to prey on each other's markets
during such periods. The import share of the U.S. steel
market rose from 15.4 percent of apparent consumption in
1990 to 16.2 percent in 1991. However, U.S. exports also
expanded by forty-seven percent in the same period. 42 As
a result of the growth in low priced imports, U.S. firms filed
the unfair trade complaints described above in 1992. Producers in Canada and Mexico then filed unfair trade complaints against U.S. exporters to their home markets. The
existence of high fixed costs and the tendency of firms in
this industry to price-cut during downturns creates conditions in which unfair trade complaints are likely to succeed
even if dumping does not reflect predatory intent.
Reliance on trade remedies to settle dumping and
CVD complaints is likely to cause further disruptions to
international steel trade. The imposition of new duties will
sharply restrict steel imports. New duties are also likely to
trigger responses from governments in other countries,
including Mexico, Canada, and other producers in the E.C.
and Japan, which could depress U.S. steel exports. Aggressive enforcement of trade remedy laws does not address the
fundamental causes of instability in the global steel market.
During the 1980s, the VRAs provided the domestic steel industry with a breathing space which allowed
them to catch up to and surpass a number of foreign
producers in terms of cost-efficiency. 43 Output per worker
increased by 4.8 percent per year between 1984 and 1990,
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as compared with 0.5 percent between 1973 and 1983. The
average real price of steel declined during the VRAs, and
by the end of the period, U.S. steel production costs were
44
lower than those in most other triad countries.
The VRAs contributed to productivity improvements in the domestic steel sector in at least two ways. First,
the VRAs guaranteed a modicum of market stability and
import protection, improving the firms' financial positions. Second, legislation which authorized the VRAs in
the U.S. Congress also required the steel firms to reinvest
their increased earnings in the industry. In addition, domestic producers developed a number ofjoint venture projects
in combination with foreign steel producers during the
1980s.
Policy Proposals
A small tariff, or an auction quota, would have
provided protection equivalent to that provided by the
VRAs for the domestic steel industry in the 1980s. An
auction quota would have had the additional advantage of
preventing import surges during periods of reduced demand, which in turn could have prevented the conditions
resulting in the filing of dumping and CVD petitions in
1992.
European and Japanese steel producers would
prefer to negotiate a new VRA with the administration, as
a settlement to the current trade cases. The Clinton Administration does not seem inclined to accept these proposals.
Given the likelihood of foreign retaliation and the development of a steel trade war, it may be prudent to consider other
policy alternatives. The Japanese recession cartel model,
which allows domestic producers to collaborate so as to
avoid price wars when demand declines, provides a highly
desirable stabilizing effect. A cartel can be designed as an
industrial policy measure which addresses the domestic
market failures associated with capital intensive production and global excess capacity. A recession cartel also
provides a forum for allocating capacity reductions across
all market participants, encouraging orderly market adjustment.
U.S. industrial adjustment would be facilitated by
new import restraints. It would also be important to create
incentives for firms to restrain prices and continue to
innovate and improve productivity in the steel industry.
However, such incentives are less important in steel than in
autos because the U.S. industry is more competitive than it
was in the 1960s and 1970s, and because of the productivity
gains made under the steel VRAs. Investment quid pro
quos implemented in the 1980s were a step in the right
direction. Targeted taxes could be used to encourage large
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producers to achieve a market share target in each year.
Firms could be required to pay ataxpenalty for falling short
of their target share and could receive a tax credit for
exceeding their target. Properly calibrated, such a taxbased incentive program could offset the price-inflating
consequences of the market-restricting measures discussed
above.
An alternative approach would combine import
restraints with direct subsidies to steel producers, following the European model. However, given the budget constraints facing the U.S. government, direct subsidy programs not offset by revenue generation measures are unlikely to be politically viable.

The Multi-FiberArrangement: Trade and the
Textiles andApparel Industries
The textile and apparel industries lost a combined
total of over 420,000 jobs between 1980 and 1991, largely
as a result of Reagan and Bush administration policies
which increased apparel imports. Policies now being discussed will accelerate the decline of both these industries,
with disastrous consequences for domestic firms and workers.
Textile and apparel have been the most consistently and heavily protected manufacturing sectors in the
United States in the post-war era. Many analysts have
suggested that the textile industry has improved its efficiency and competitiveness under this arrangement, while
the apparel industry has not. While this perspective is
accurate at one level, it ignores the symbiotic relationship
which exists between these two industries. The U.S. textile

A permanent executive
branch agency with primary
responsibility for industrial and
trade policy development
would possess several
important advantages over
the national commission
model.
industry is highly dependent on domestic apparel manufacturers as a source of demand for its products. During the
period of protection, the textile industry invested in new,
capital intensive modes of production, primarily in the
synthetic-fiberbased markets. Itbecame one of the world's
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most competitive producers of such products and by 1980
the United States had become a net exporter of textiles.
Textile productivity growth has been substantially above
the average for all manufacturing industries and as a result
consumers have realized substantial benefits in the form of
lower prices. Employment shrank in the 1970s at a rate of
1.2 percent per year, despite the fact that real output was
growing.
Productivity growth in apparel, on the other hand,
has lagged behind the manufacturing average for several
decades. Manufacturers remained competitive by putting
downward pressure on real wages. The growth of apparel
imports was limited in the 1970s to an average of 8.8
percent per year (in real value terms) by the Multi-Fiber
Arrangement ("MFA"). The real value of U.S. apparel
production increased by two percent per year. As a result,
apparel employment fell by less than 0.3 percent per year
in the 1970s. The growth of apparel output contributed to
textile demand and helped to restrain employment losses in
that sector. Most apparel exporting countries (e.g., the big
four: China, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong) also restrict
textile imports, so that domestic apparel demand has been
46
the foundation for the textile industry's recovery.
Market Opening Initiatives
In the 1980s, relaxed MFA enforcement, expanded
quotas, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and an overvalued
dollar resulted in an increase in the growth of U.S. apparel
imports to 10.8 percent per year in real value terms. As a
result, textile and apparel output was constant between
1980 and 1990 and employment in both industries fell by
about three percent per year. Displaced apparel and textile
workers are frequently from minority groups and are often
women living in rural areas or immigrants in large cities.
Up to thirty percent of these workers will drop out of the
labor force if they become unemployed, resulting in the
permanent loss of their output and increased social costs.
Policy proposals currently being discussed will substantially increase textile and apparel imports.
A proposal to phase out the MFA within ten years
has been adopted in the "Chairman's Text" in the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations. Elimination of the MFA
would dramatically increase imports and job losses in these
two industries, with disastrous consequences for many of
the very low income workers which they employ.
The dramatic growth of both legal and illegal
imports from countries such as China and India are of major
concern in the industry. China is accused of circumventing
its MFA by shipping products to countries which are not
significant exporters (and are hence exempt from the MFA)

and re-labeling their products for re-shipment to the United
States.
Policy Proposal
Two principles should guide the formation of
trade and adjustment policies. First, we should recognize
that trade adjustment is costly for firms and workers and
adopt policies to minimize adjustment costs for the economy
while achieving gains for consumers from increased trade
liberalization. Second, we need to develop industrial assistance plans and policies which reflect the unique institutional characteristics and structural needs of each of these
sectors.
Adjustment costs can be minimized in the textile
and apparel industries by returning to the original MFA
framework, which called for imports to grow by six percent
per year. This limit was ignored in the 1980s and the
proposed elimination of the MFA will generate a flood of
new imports. From the current import base, six percent

In the U.S. context, the
Federal Reserve system,
independent from the
influence of partisan politics,
may be a more appropriate
model for an industrial policy
agenda.
import growth will provide substantial market access for
importers, with attendant benefits for consumers.
The MFA should be converted to a global auction
quota in order to eliminate cheating problems and to increase U.S. government revenues. These new revenues
could then be used to expand a program of trade adjustment
assistance and create new manufacturing extension services for the apparel and textile industries, to compensate
displaced workers, and to help create comparative advantage for U.S. firms.
IndustrialAssistance for the Apparel Industry
There are a number of industrial policies which
can help U.S. apparel producers move into higher valueadded product lines and production niches in which they
can be more competitive. 47 The core model is the Quick
Response System ("QR"). This system would displace the
older "progressive-bundle" batch production modes in job
oriented contractor shops with more flexible, product (as
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opposed to piece) oriented work patterns. These patterns
are tied to the computerization and networking of the entire
fiber-textile-apparel-retailing complex.
1. MarketMatching Programsfor Small and Medium Suppliers. There are scale economies involved in the
marketing of apparel production services which tend to
disadvantage small producers (who are more flexible and
better suited to QR production). What the industry requires
is the domestic equivalent of U.S. Department of Commerce programs for the Caribbean Basic Initiative, which
links apparel buyers with contractors ready to supply
capacity in the Caribbean, but not in the continental United
States.
2. Promote the Formation of Cooperatives in
Apparel Production.At low output levels there are economies of scale in the administration of apparel firms (e.g.,
payroll) and in the provision of engineering services. There
are also economies of scope available to groups of firms in
a common location. These concepts have been pioneered in
Northern Italy, and have been cultivated in state-level
economic development programs in the northeastern, southern and western United States. Such programs can be tied
to the provision of low-cost space (for example, in incubators).
3. Industrial Extension Services. Governments
can take advantage of externalities in the development and
dissemination of technical knowledge among groups of
small firms. These services, which are also being developed on an experimental basis at the state level, can provide
design services, worker and management training programs, and can disseminate information about new design
and production systems. This concept is based on the
hugely successful model of the U.S. agricultural extension
service.
4. Credit for Small- and Medium-sized Firms.
Historically this industry has relied on non-bank "factors"
for working capital. Not only is this more expensive than
the traditional bank financing (unavailable, because few
physical assets are available for securing loans), but it has
become increasingly hard to find in the late 1980s as a
result of the bank crises and resulting credit crunch. Revolving credit funds have been an important part of the
package of support developed for Northern Italian apparel
cooperatives.
5. Public Health Insurance. The high costs of
health insurance have been well documented by industrial
giants such as the Chrysler Corporation. However, the cost
of employer provided insurance is higher in the apparel
industry than in other manufacturing sectors because of its:
1) high labor intensity, making the per unit effect on
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product costs much higher in apparel than in a unit of
similar cost made with less labor inputs; 2) low wages
(since health care is more or less a fixed cost item, it causes
a larger proportionate increase in production expenses in
apparel than in a high wage sector such as autos). Proposals
which require all employers to pay for health insurance will
be disproportionately more expensive for apparel firms
than for firms in high wage sectors such as motor vehicles,
for both of these reasons. Publicly funded health insurance
could eliminate this source of competitive disadvantage for
U.S. apparel producers, vis-a-vis foreign producers.
Funding for some or all of these programs could
be provided out of revenues from tariffs or from auction
quota revenues on apparel imports, if the United States opts
to tarifficate the MFAs. This approach is consistent with
trade adjustment assistance statutes, which have focused
on positive adjustment programs since at least 1974.
The textile industry can prosper with a healthy
U.S. apparel industry. However, if the textile sector's
competitiveness is to be maintained, official pressure may
be required to open export markets as we open our own
apparel markets.
CONSTRUCTING A NEW POLICY REGIME
New industrial policies are constantly being developed in the United States. Most are implicit, generated
as largely unintended by-products of existing laws and
programs. They include trade policies resulting from antidumping and countervailing duty regulation (such as the
VRAs in steel and autos and duties imposed in many other
cases); public procurement programs; and restrictions on
the export of high technology products.
The Clinton administration has proposed a new
approach to industrial policy development which utilizes
ad hoc national committees to address the needs of particular industries. The problems of the airline industry, and
their connections to aircraft production, will be the first to
be addressed using this approach. The national commission
model, if it includes representatives of business and labor
as well as the government, reflects a corporatist approach
which is new for the United States. Corporatist policy
development has been widely criticized because it assumes
that each interest group accrues benefits for all its members, whereas industrial policy decisions in reality often
48
involve picking winners and losers.
A permanent executive branch agency with primary responsibility for industrial and trade policy development would possess several important advantages over the
national commission model. First, it would provide some
degree of insulation from the special interests of particular
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industries, groups of workers, and state and local governments. Second, this agency would also develop the capacity to collect and evaluate data on the performance and
competitiveness of a broad array of domestic industries.
Access to accurate and timely data is essential to effective
policy development and one of the most disturbing legacies
of the Reagan/Bush era is that federal data collection
systems were allowed to atrophy and have, in many cases,
been eliminated. Finally, an industrial policy agency would
also be responsible for coordinating policy across sectors,
and for considering the impacts of policy in one sector on
the competitiveness of others.
Close attention should be paid to the political and
administrative status of any new industrial policy agency.
The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
is often cited as a model. However, it is important to recall
that Japan is a parliamentary democracy with a strong,
centralized federal government. Executive branch agencies in the United States have much less independence
because they are imbedded in a weak, decentralized system
of governance. In the U.S. context, the Federal Reserve
system, independent from the influence of partisan politics,
may be a more appropriate model for an industrial policy
agency.
This review has demonstrated that trade adjustment assistance can work. The United States has one of the
most competitive textile industries in the world, a direct
result of more than three decades of protection under the
MFA. The steel industry also made great progress while it
was protected in the 1980s by a VRA. On the other hand,
U.S. auto makers failed to increase their competitiveness
under the VRAs because they were not allowed to develop
an industry restructuring plan and a set of productivity
enhancing quid pro quo commitments during the policy
making process. The apparel industry has continued to
decline, under the same protection provided to the textile
sector, because the particular market failures and structural
problems common to this industry have not been addressed
with appropriate industrial policies.
The principles which could be used to guide the
development of effective trade and industrial policy programs for the United States are well known. The constraints
are largely political. Ideological opposition to an activist
role for government is stronger in the United States than in
any other large, developed economy and is a major impediment to development of new policy institutions. However,
there are a large number of interest groups which could be
mobilized to support new governmental capacity to develop effective trade and industrial policies. Leadership is
the key missing ingredient. I
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